For him, inegalitarian, authoritarian associations are better suited to 2 engender political passivity. The principal reason that considerations of theory cannot be dis- 6 placed by those of empirical conditions for democracy is that theory is 7 required to indicate what the conditions are supposed to be for. For this 2 purpose it is best that the factions of a republic be widely diffused across a large jurisdiction and governmental functions be exercised exclusively by 4 representatives who are, moreover, constrained by the checks and balances 5 of a division of powers.
Krouse borrows the terms given to these two view- 2 points on democracy by C. Hence, to identify con- 6 ditions for democracy is already to suppose democratic-theoretical principles. For 2 instance, Robert Dahl ch. While Schumpeter 7 thought democracy required relative freedom of government from public 8 scrutiny, Michael Margolis makes encouragement of public criticism of gov- 9 ernment one of the conditions for a viable democracy —5. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers list publicly organized debate as a precondition for the 1 form of democracy they favour —7 , unlike Schmitt, who, as noted 2 earlier, criticized parliamentarianism largely for spawning what he saw as 3 debilitating and divisive debate.
Roland Pennock 3 regarding agrarian, but not industrialized societies But such prescriptions will always be 2 themselves laden with prior theories about the nature and value of democracy. In so doing, I shall abstract from efforts to explain the pervasive- 8 ness of institutions and practices called liberal democratic to focus on core 9 features of the theory. His own good.
Because these civil liberties typically and directly affect only those who enjoy them, people should be exempt from 1 the interference, paternalistic or otherwise, by others and especially by the 2 state, including the democratic state 16— That is, he favoured preservation of a distinction 7 between private and public realms and the rule of law. These and other 3 such differences are clearly very important at the level of ongoing liberal- 4 democratic practice, but their connection to general theory is no more than 5 indirect.
Similarly, debates over how to interpret civil liberties — for instance, 6 whether or not advertizing is a form of expression to be protected as freedom 7 of speech or whether restrictions on campaign financing are a violation of 8 civil rights — reflect differences over the application of liberal-democratic 9 principles rather than differences over the principles themselves.
This is the element 6 of his characterization of liberal democracy in the list above that is not shared 7 by all liberal-democratic theorists for instance Giovanni Sartori or William 8 Riker. If Mill 1 held that democracy should only be by direct participation or that repre- 2 sentative democracy is not only necessary, but a necessary evil, these critics 3 would be right. However, Mill thought that representative democracy had 4 some positive features of its own such as making it easier to ensure that 5 government decisions would be made by educated people and that, when 6 feasible, it should be combined with direct participation.
Because a measure 7 of participatory democracy, albeit limited, is allowed to be possible and desir- 8 able by theorists even more closely identified with liberal democracy than 9 Schumpeter, such as Robert Dahl a: —3, —9 , a case can be made to consider this an area of disagreement within liberal-democratic 1 theory, rather than as a dividing line between it and alternatives.
Mill is often and in important respects 6 justly classified an egalitarian. He was among the few males of his time force- 7 fully to advocate extension of the franchise to women Mill  , 8 and his views on the distribution of wealth put him toward the socialistic 9 end of a spectrum of stances on the question of how far liberal democrats should insist on politics favouring social and economic equality.
The late Isaiah Berlin, 2 while not explicitly anti-egalitarian, was sceptical about sanctioning more 3 than formal, political equality in the name of liberal democracy 4 . On the mainstream view, political equality is a central value and is interpreted 1 as equality in the polling booth.
He expresses the view shared by all liberal-democratic theorists 1 that the former ought to contain the power of democratically elected govern- 2 ments over individuals by putting constraints on state actions and by limiting 3 the scope of permissible state action.
See a Problem?
In addition, Mill describes one way that democracy strengthens civil liberties as well as political ones. This is by conferring 1 legitimacy on liberal laws, which a populace is more likely to respect if they 2 have been popularly mandated as in a democratically endorsed constitu- 3 tion than if imposed a : By restricting the domain of proper government 2 activity to the public realm, bureaucracy is kept in check, which not only 3 protects people from its interference with their freedoms, but also enables 4 the citizenry at large to develop skills important for self-government b 5 : —8.
On the assumptions that citizens empowered to govern themselves 9 would prefer to do so from the vantage point of knowledge and that restric- tions on the freedom of speech impede this by stifling vigorous debate and 1 the exploration of unconventional ideas, this liberal freedom should be 2 protected for the sake of an ongoing and vibrant democracy Mill b : 24, Oppenheim Or again, while many liberal- 1 democratic theorists value the rule of law for its function of containing 2 democracy, some prescribe that such things as judicial review be made 3 subservient to democracy.
For instance, according to John Hart Ely this 4 should be limited just to ensuring procedural fairness in dispute resolution 5 and prohibiting individuals and minorities from being denied access to 6 democratic participation Ely These will 4 be taken up after a digression on political philosophy and liberal-democratic 5 theory in general. Indeed, critics of liberal 3 democracy sometimes identify it with individualist reductionism in social 4 philosophy Unger 81—2. A challenging task in the history of ideas is 3 to interrogate such claims of correlation by questioning whether adherence 4 to philosophical positions motivates stances regarding democratic politics or 5 determination to justify political positions motivates theorists to invent or 6 seize upon philosophical positions for this purpose.
Examples of theorists 7 who, in different ways, take on aspects of this task are Quentin Skinner 8 and Russell Hanson Still, I cannot resist regis- 2 tering a suspicion that democratic theorists are rarely if ever driven by 3 abstract philosophy to major political stances they would rather not take. An example is offered 7 in recent work by philosophical students of racism who have shown how 8 such things as racial exclusion and colonialism were justified by Locke, Kant, 9 and Mill alike, notwithstanding the differences among their philosophical theories Eze , Mills , Goldberg Putting aside the sceptical 1 observations in this digression, four areas of theoretical controversy where 2 philosophical and political considerations overlap will now be added to those 3 reviewed above.
For example, freedom of association may be curtailed 7 when it can be shown that it would so dramatically harm others that an excep- 8 tion should be made to a general rule favouring this freedom, but the burden 9 of proof resides with one who would limit this freedom. Most basic rights theorists recognize that rights claims 8 may conflict and that rights do not admit of strict hierarchical ordering, so 9 sometimes ad hoc decisions must be made. Philosophical contractarians have in mind not actual, explicit contracts, but hypothetical contracts about what 1 rational people would agree to.
In addition to prompting disagreements 2 depending on what is thought rational, this allows for alternative interpreta- 3 tions of what a hypothetical contract mandates in real political circum- 4 stances. Moreover, contemporary political philosophers, like their classic 5 predecessors, provide themselves with additional flexibility by limiting the 6 appropriate subjects of rights or democratic entitlement to just certain types 7 of individuals, for instance to citizens or to adults. It was mainly by denial of 8 full personhood that classic theorists were able to withhold rights and 9 entitlements from women, aboriginal peoples, or slaves.
Thus, while Mill favoured 3 combining representative and participatory democracy, Schumpeterian theo- 4 rists are wary of citizen participation which they pessimistically think is no 5 more capable of educating masses of people to effective government than 6 anything else. Mill believed that formal and informal education could 7 increasingly bring people to cooperative values, but Madison and those who 8 followed him saw no prospect for overcoming factional conflict and compe- 9 tition within populations and hence prescribed, for example, systems of checks and balances and divisions of powers between state and federal 1 government to contain it.
If it is taken to refer to 1 the doctrine that reference to group membership is inappropriate in assigning 2 rights to individuals then Kymlicka does, indeed, count as a nonindividu- 3 alist.
Contemporary Political Theory | palgrave
This topic will be taken up later in the chapter. Assuming, however, that it is 5 possible to set such usages aside with respect to the conception of individ- 6 ualism specific to liberal democracy, two theoretical debates remain. One 7 debate is over whether societies ought to accommodate themselves to existing 8 preferences of individuals. This debate will be taken up in later chapters, 9 especially those treating civic republican, participatory, and deliberative theories. Another debate, which will not be pursued further, is over whether 1 indifference or agnosticism about fundamental theses of social ontology or 2 philosophical anthropology can, after all, be sustained.
Perhaps the consis- 3 tent liberal-democratic theorist must be an existentialist, or, alternatively, 4 a deterministic individualist of the Hobbesist variety. If some such connec- 5 tion could be proven and if in addition the position to which the liberal 6 democrat is committed were decisively defeated, then, depending on how 7 vital to liberal democracy the position in question is, this would constitute 8 grounds for its rejection. Despite the attraction of strategies like this to polit- 9 ical philosophers, success of arguments at such fundamental levels are rarely if ever acknowledged by anyone but their proponents.
By contrast, those in the lineage of Hobbes see freedom 1 as the ability simply to act on present preferences, so people may still be free 2 even if their aspirations are fixed or determined outside their own control. But those in the autonomy camp are wont to advance 6 the more ambitious prescription that the liberal state ought actively to 7 promote autonomy. This will likely generate policy recommendations, for 8 instance, favouring public education about alternative life options and train- 9 ing in critical thinking to assist people in examining and revising their goals.
That such 2 a correlation is a tendency rather than a necessity is indicated by the fact 3 that Mill was both a determinist and a developmental democrat. Hence, to defend himself against 8 fellow advocates of group rights who fear that his viewpoint might under- 9 mine group cohesion, Kymlicka is at pains to indicate that defection by a person from his or her group-determined values is relatively rare Part of his argument 6 works as well against a conception of autonomy.
Theories of Democracy : A Critical Introduction
In this respect he shares the orientation of another defender of positive 9 liberty against Berlin, the late C. With this notion, 6 he is taking issue with a nineteenth-century theorist, Benjamin Constant, 7 on whose views Berlin draws. However, 4 Mill did not qualify the freedoms that are to be protected by liberal rights 5 or figure in democratic processes with the specification that they be 6 compatible with the development of human potentials, political engage- 7 ment, or the pursuit of objectively worthwhile goals.
He could not do 8 this consistently with his endorsement of pluralism according to which 9 the state is not to specify what sorts of life aims people may try to pursue. See Sullivan et al. This problem does not admit of easy solu- 5 tion from within a liberal-democratic framework. To maintain that people 6 should be free as long as their freedom does not restrict that of others would 7 too severely limit the scope of pluralism, due to the pervasiveness of conflicts.
But in addition to being 6 subject to contested interpretation and abuse for instance, of the sort justi- 7 fied in the name of liberal values during the McCarthy era in the US , this 8 does not easily work to rule out things like religious intolerance that, unlike 9 limitations on freedom of political expression or association, do not always have direct political consequences. It also does not easily rule out practices 1 oppressive to the members of a minority population that is sufficiently 2 isolated that general tolerance in its larger society is not threatened.
Arguing 3 that tolerance is inviolate in the private realm but not the public shifts the 4 problem to identifying the boundary between the private and the public 5 domains, or, alternatively, of determining when private-realm behaviour 6 merits exceptional state interference. Electoral successes in Europe from time to time of extreme 2 right-wing political parties pose the same problem. Few liberal-democratic theorists are pre- pared to defend positions at these poles; though Berlin represents a viewpoint 1 close to the first polar position and William Galston and the late 2 Jean Hampton are close to the second pole.
Thus, unlike Galston and Hampton, Bruce Ackerman and 6 Charles Larmore seek defences of the principle of liberal neutrality 7 that are as far as possible void of philosophical commitments to a concept 8 of a good society or life. These authors attempt to defend neutrality by refer- 9 ence to the conditions required for people with different values to carry on fruitful and nondestructive debates about matters like the distribution of 1 political powers.
Consistently with this orientation, they hold that disagree- 2 ments in actual political forums over basic moral values be set aside when 3 they impede attempts to pursue political dialogue, thus differing from 4 Hampton or Galston.
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Joseph Raz pt 2 defends liberalism by refer- 5 ence to the nonneutral moral principle of individual autonomy, but derives 6 political prescriptions from it which are more pluralist than those of 7 Hampton or Galston. Critics of Rawls 2 have maintained that this position is unstable and should be pushed in the 3 direction either of more neutrality Larmore or of less neutrality Hampton Defending what she considers a radicalized form of 2 liberal democracy, Chantal Mouffe chs 3, 9 regards approaches like those of Rawls, as of Habermas, as efforts to impose some form of philo- 4 sophical orderliness or closure on political realms that admit of neither.
That the connection between pro 2 or antifoundationalism and philosophical or political approaches to such 3 topics as tolerance is not clear cut is indicated by the ambiguous stance of 4 Rawls who is criticized for foundationalism by Mouffe while also recognizing 5 the ambiguity, 43 at the same time as he is claimed by Richard Rorty 6 as a fellow antifoundationalist ch. For instance, agreeing with the value Kymlicka puts on autonomy, but also 1 thinking that his reluctance to prescribe legislation against groups or activ- 2 ities deemed intolerant is well founded, someone could favour neutrality 3 even in matters of education on the grounds that the distinction between 4 force and persuasion in this domain cannot be sustained.
A philosophical 5 moral relativist, who thinks that value judgments cannot be justified by any 6 but prudential considerations, might be drawn to a very generous interpre- 7 tation of the scope of tolerance, since nobody would have objective grounds 8 for prescribing intolerance. But Mill also favoured a generous interpreta- 9 tion for the objectively proposed reason that general human happiness is promoted by protection of civil liberties, and a relativist might prescribe 1 intolerant policies to escape the chaos of power politics in a world with no 2 objective moral standards, just as Hobbes favoured monarchy to escape the 3 violent chaos of amoral conflict and competition.
That there are historical asso- 6 ciations among liberal democracy, the nation state, and capitalism there can 7 be no doubt, and on some political-theoretical methodologies this fact illus- 8 trates that these three things are unavoidably integrated. This is the view- 9 point, for instance, of Fukuyama, who embeds his conception of political and economic arrangements in an historically evolutionary theory accord- 1 ing to which capitalism and state-based liberal-democratic government 2 represent the pinnacle of human development. This is most 6 clearly the case for those Marxists who regard political values and institu- 7 tions as nothing but superstructural reinforcements of economic forces and 8 relations for instance, Hoffman , Wood On 2 his view liberal democracy and capitalism are united in one such epistemo- 3 logical package Barber —7.
Against their views are those of 4 liberal-democratic socialists, such as Norberto Bobbio , who cham- 5 pion socialism in part because they think it better realizes the values of liberal 6 democracy than does capitalism. It is imaginable that a prosocialist political party or coalition 3 would form a government and implement economic policies strongly enough 4 egalitarian and market constraining to count as noncapitalist, while main- 5 taining representative government and protection of civil rights.
Unlike their critics from the 1 orthodox Marxist left, most nonsocialist liberal-democratic critics at the time 2 charged the Eurocommunists not with conceptual confusion, but with insin- 3 cerity in their adherence to liberal democracy. This topic will 3 be pursued in the discussion appended to this chapter. However, it may be useful to disentangle 7 some of the concepts and controversies involved in this topic.
Debates on 8 it are clouded by an often-encountered fusion of the notions of nation and 9 state.